Risk assessments go deeper than it happened, it could happen again.So while we know it could happen again, we are going to pretend that it won't because it hasn't happened for years. That's about what this approach amounts to. The fact that these incidents have not occurred for a long time does not mean that they are "extremely unlikely".
It's also what could happen and probably more likely
Sounds more like another sacred cow reaction.
In addition, it's not as though a failsafe system has been put in place to prevent these incidents. That leaves a number of other factors that form part of the reason why they have not happened, such as the tightening of the rule for passing red automatic signals, perhaps better maintenance to reduce the risk of derailment etc but also luck. It's not there for us to measure but luck or chance does come into it, and it can go either way.
What failsafe systems are in place to ensure that the line is protected following an emergency like a derailment or collision? None. The communication equipment is nowhere near failsafe. Detonators aren't failsafe either, but they are another layer to complement other non failsafe systems.
If non failsafe systems have to be used, I think a few degrees of redundancy would be a good idea, and this is what we have at the moment. Fewer layers of protection mean more reliance on luck when the S hits the youknowwhat. Are they really eliminating one of those layers to save a few dollars when they have a legal SFAIRP requirement?
It's also what could happen and probably more likely - like someone getting rundown trying to place the fire-crackers.
In terms of cost/benefit stuff, I wonder how many detonator thieving trespasser fatalities a single derailment and collision would be equivalent to in terms of cost. For a start, few trespasser fatalities have anything to do with detonators. If they even bothered to do an analysis on the risks of not having detonators for protection they probably would have come out with some stupid result like less than one in the number of stars in the universe.
I know the contents of the rule book is a slightly different issue, but the Brits still have pretty comprehensive details on emergency protection in theirs http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Rule_Book/Rule%20Book%20Modules/M%20-%20Mishaps,%20Incidents%20and%20Extreme%20Weather/GERT8000-M1%20Iss%202.pdf which includes the following:
You must carry out emergency protection if:
• the signaller cannot provide signal protection, or
• you have not been able to contact the signaller.
It really makes the risks pretty clear to me.
What is going to happen under those condtions in this network?
What makes us think we are so much better?