Vline service crashes into Metro Train at Galvin

 
  bevans Site Admin

Location: Melbourne, Australia
Rubbish.
ZH836301


Not entirely. Kennett did leave quite a mess. I could go into the projects which he undertook which have not been good for Victoria but that is for another time. Even people in the maintenance side of the network in Melbourne and elsewhere have been critical of what he caused but I also say the blame also needs to go to other people as well.

Kennett is certainly not responsible for all the issues the network has but he did kill freight off the network.

Labor is clearly responsible for the mess which is the Bendigo line north of Kyneton. Kosky and Bachelor were not the best transport ministers but who has been?

Kosky toward the end it was embarrassing.  Rome was burning and she was telling the public rumours of a fire were false.

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  mrmoopt Chief Commissioner

Location: _
Compliance if an issue should definitely be enforced.
A good read is:
http://www.uic.org/cdrom/2008/11_wcrr2008/pdf/O.3.3.5.1.pdf

Shows a similar problem in the future... if Metro moves to CBTC (moving block), it still needs to work with TPWS.

Both operators should just move to ETCS- but who will fund the equipment change? Part of the system for ETCS, GSM-R is already in place. It shouldn't be a hard transition.
  YM-Mundrabilla Minister for Railways

Location: Mundrabilla but I'd rather be in Narvik
Compliance if an issue should definitely be enforced.
A good read is:
http://www.uic.org/cdrom/2008/11_wcrr2008/pdf/O.3.3.5.1.pdf

Shows a similar problem in the future... if Metro moves to CBTC (moving block), it still needs to work with TPWS.

Both operators should just move to ETCS- but who will fund the equipment change? Part of the system for ETCS, GSM-R is already in place. It shouldn't be a hard transition.
calt

Aaaaaaaaaaaaarrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrggggggggggghhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.

Yet more meaningless acronyms.
If you mean your post to be in any way informative we should not have to look up google abbreviations and take one's pick.
Even the linked doc is full of unexplained acronyms although some are explained but most are not.
  JGS Well. We'll see about THAT!

Location: Junee NSW
Mod note:

Lose the acronyms. They're pretentious and esoteric.

Please rewrite this in language that everyone can understand.

Thanks,
Matt
  KRviator Moderator

Location: Up the front
Compliance should be enforced, but it isn't - and no one seems to give a stuff. Not management, not ARTC and not the regulators. And situations like Craigieburn, Kogarah and Moss Vale's CSB failure will continue to happen until someone pulls their head out of their smeg and acknowledges the problem.
  seb2351 Chief Commissioner

Location: Sydney
Compliance should be enforced, but it isn't - and no one seems to give a stuff. Not management, not ARTC and not the regulators. And situations like Craigieburn, Kogarah and Moss Vale's CSB failure will continue to happen until someone pulls their head out of their smeg and acknowledges the problem.
KRviator

Hang on a second... Are you really suggesting that no one is doing anything pro-actively to manage the situation?

Separating for a second that the Controlled Signalling Blocking (CSB) issue, and the general issue of railway operation compliance to network rules are two thorns in the side of many an operator there is a LOT being done. Unfortunately, the system is trying to balance the need to run with a productivity divided AND run safely. It is not working.

In terms of the regulator, I can say with confidence that this issue of compliance, and reporting of incidents to monitor compliance has been a strong theme this year. The development of organisation level policies and procedures to mitigate SPAD and safe-working breaches has a lot of managers sleeping less of late.

In terms of training, the provision of network wide refresher training and enhanced auditing from RailCorp, ARTC and JHR continues. Particularly in the matters of issuing track work authorities. Numerous notices have been issued at operator, regulator and transport provider level.

Beyond stopping all trains and banning the use of Controlled/Absolute blocking and Lookout working as valid methods of work on track authorities, I cannot see what more can done.

I am particularly surprised that you feel that this issue is not being given credible attention in particular by operators and the regulator, because I for one can vouch that it is very much in their crosshairs.

Circling back to the matter of CSB/ASB (A for Absolute)I can see there are numerous investigations currently being performed by the relevant authority. Preliminary reports all suggest a common theme that the issuing of such authorities is not being performed as robustly as it should be. This once again, comes down to a training and monitoring issue that is being tackled by a number of initiatives led by both RailCorp and the National Regulator in particular. It's not a matter of "lack of experience" leading to these incidents either: both new and "old hands" are making the mistakes. I will leave further comments till the full release of such reports comes into the public spheres, but in the meantime as a rail safety worker the best I can do is to ensure I double check my work and confirm that I am complying with the rules of safe-working, as I would hope every other rail safety worker would do as well.
  YM-Mundrabilla Minister for Railways

Location: Mundrabilla but I'd rather be in Narvik
CSB
ASB
Sorry but I am from an era of railways when we spoke English (even the Uniform Four Letter Telegraph Code was only used internally between those who knew it).
  seb2351 Chief Commissioner

Location: Sydney
CSB
ASB
Sorry but I am from an era of railways when we spoke English (even the Uniform Four Letter Telegraph Code was only used internally between those who knew it).
YM-Mundrabilla

Definitions for the terms I have used in my post, for those who would still be confused about what the difference between controlled signal blocking and lookout working can be found here).
http://www.artc.com.au/library/ARTC%20NSW%20Glossary%20I%202%20Rev%200.pdf
  historian Deputy Commissioner

Compliance if an issue should definitely be enforced.
A good read is:
http://www.uic.org/cdrom/2008/11_wcrr2008/pdf/O.3.3.5.1.pdf

Shows a similar problem in the future... if Metro moves to CBTC (moving block), it still needs to work with TPWS.

Both operators should just move to ETCS- but who will fund the equipment change? Part of the system for ETCS, GSM-R is already in place. It shouldn't be a hard transition.
calt


(For those not up to date with modern railway terms here is a crash course... ETCS = European Train Control System - an international standard for a system that supervises a train's speed and applies the brakes if it exceeds the allowed speed. In particular on the approach to signals, and after passing at stop. In comes in three flavours - Level 1 which is similar to previous proprietary systems, Level 2 which uses mobile telephone technology (GSM-R) to communicate allowed speed to trains, and Level 3 which also uses train equipment to tell the central system, via mobile phone, where it is. Level 3 doesn't exist as tested product yet. Upgrading between levels requires installing significant new kit and is not cheap.)

Shouldn't be a hard transition? Don't make me laugh. GSM-R is only a small part of the story. All levels of ETCS require a complex package of equipment fitted at, effectively, each driving station. ETCS Level 1 also requires the fitting of significant equipment at each signal. It does have a safety benefit - reduction in SPADs and rear end collisions. In theory, it also allows the removal of line side signalling (provided all trains are fitted). It will also reduce the capacity of lines at congested locations. Few railways internationally have been able to justify its costs when retrofitted to an existing railway. It's a different situation for new railways.

ETCS Level 2 avoids this reduction in capacity (but doesn't add any capacity). It would also require the resignalling of significant portions of the network (anywhere where the signalling is driven by relays or, heaven forfend, mechanical interlockings). As I have said, Level 3 doesn't even exist yet as commercial off the shelf product.

The whole area of train control is evolving rapidly at the moment. If a railway can wait, it is probably best to wait for the availability of off-the-shelf ETCS Level 3. Level 3 will give the greatest benefits for the cost.
  theanimal Chief Commissioner

Compliance should be enforced, but it isn't - and no one seems to give a stuff. Not management, not ARTC and not the regulators. And situations like Craigieburn, Kogarah and Moss Vale's CSB failure will continue to happen until someone pulls their head out of their smeg and acknowledges the problem.
KRviator

And you know this how?
  bevans Site Admin

Location: Melbourne, Australia
Now the incident has been cleared and the investigation is underway what of the two trains themselves?  Where are they current stored and when will repairs get underway?
  KRviator Moderator

Location: Up the front
Hang on a second... Are you really suggesting that no one is doing anything pro-actively to manage the situation?
Seb2351

I'm not saying no one is trying, but what little is being done isn't nearly sufficient to stop incidents - simple, yet potentially severe incidents - from happening time and time again. And those that are trying to mitigate things don't seem to have the authority to change the culture that has crept into the industry.

Unfortunately, the system is trying to balance the need to run with a productivity divided AND run safely. It is not working
Seb2351

And the question that needs to be asked here is, why isn't it? The airline industry can do both, generally speaking and the level of regulation is a lot higher than ours.

In terms of the regulator, I can say with confidence that this issue of compliance, and reporting of incidents to monitor compliance has been a strong theme this year. The development of organisation level policies and procedures to mitigate SPAD and safe-working breaches has a lot of managers sleeping less of late.
Seb2351

That may well be so in some instances, but when you have someone in the position of "Training and Rail Safety Coordinator" tell you that "The TOC Manual is a guide only, if we don't abide by it the risk is on the company", or to run a train with a brake certificate that is 8 days overdue for its' PM cycle, clearly things have a long way to go.

In terms of training, the provision of network wide refresher training and enhanced auditing from RailCorp, ARTC and JHR continues. Particularly in the matters of issuing track work authorities. Numerous notices have been issued at operator, regulator and transport provider level.
Seb2351

But they aren't working. For proof of that, look at the repeated instances of worksite protection instances. And these are only the ones that get reported to the regulator. What about the ones that don't get reported and dealt with at the crew level? How many of these events are there? No one really knows.

Beyond stopping all trains and banning the use of Controlled/Absolute blocking and Lookout working as valid methods of work on track authorities, I cannot see what more can done.
Seb2351

How about actual repercussions for intentionally putting peoples lives at risk? Tell a crew the blocks are on, when they aren't and you're out the door. No ifs, buts or maybes. There's no excuse for it. Stuffup the way you ask a signaller for a CSB and that's your first warning. You don't get a second -the next serious instance you're gone. Not just to another operator, but gone.

Circling back to the matter of CSB/ASB (A for Absolute)I can see there are numerous investigations currently being performed by the relevant authority. Preliminary reports all suggest a common theme that the issuing of such authorities is not being performed as robustly as it should be.
Seb2351

And here is proof there is an issue. "Numerous investigations". Not one or two, but several, across the state. And these are the ones that are still active, not counting the completed ones.

Compliance should be enforced, but it isn't - and no one seems to give a stuff. Not management, not ARTC and not the regulators. And situations like Craigieburn, Kogarah and Moss Vale's CSB failure will continue to happen until someone pulls their head out of their smeg and acknowledges the problem.
And you know this how?
theanimal

KRviator

9 years on locos watching it happen. You don't have to be a genius to realise multiple investigations by the ATSB, PTSV and OTSI have recurring themes, suggesting there is an issue.
  Gman_86 Chief Commissioner

Location: Melton, where the sparks dare not roam!
Currently stored at Newport
  theanimal Chief Commissioner


9 years on locos watching it happen. You don't have to be a genius to realise multiple investigations by the ATSB, PTSV and OTSI have recurring themes, suggesting there is an issue.
KRviator

and there will always be recurring themes, because people are people.

There becomes a finite point when the sheer cost of implementing engineered systems outweighs their benefits.

I am sure that the same arguments were had over the introduction of driver safety systems (vigilance control) albeit that their was was no internet to open the discussion up.

However, big business is in the business of making profits, watch the arguments that are occurring in America over single crewing, look at the arguments that occurred in Aus over the same issue. I was stood down in NSw over the 2 man crewing dispute for removing brakevans, so have a history in this.

However read any investigation report from Australia in the last 15 years, we seem to have gone down the path of having an investigation, but rather than making findings that require action, there are recommendations etc.

Read the statement at the end of an ATSB report "
Purpose of safety investigations
The object of a safety investigation is to identify and reduce safety-related risk. ATSB
investigations determine and communicate the factors related to the transport safety matter being
investigated.
It is not a function of the ATSB to apportion blame or determine liability. At the same time, an
investigation report must include factual material of sufficient weight to support the analysis and
findings. At all times the ATSB endeavours to balance the use of material that could imply adverse
comment with the need to properly explain what happened, and why, in a fair and unbiased
manner.
Developing safety action
Central to the ATSB’s investigation of transport safety matters is the early identification of safety
issues in the transport environment. The ATSB prefers to encourage the relevant organisation(s)
to initiate proactive safety action that addresses safety issues. Nevertheless, the ATSB may use
its power to make a formal safety recommendation either during or at the end of an investigation,
depending on the level of risk associated with a safety issue and the extent of corrective action
undertaken by the relevant organisation.
When safety recommendations are issued, they focus on clearly describing the safety issue of
concern, rather than providing instructions or opinions on a preferred method of corrective action.
As with equivalent overseas organisations, the ATSB has no power to enforce the implementation
of its recommendations. It is a matter for the body to which an ATSB recommendation is directed
to assess the costs and benefits of any particular means of addressing a safety issue.
When the ATSB issues a safety recommendation to a person, organisation or agency, they must
provide a written response within 90 days. That response must indicate whether they accept the
recommendation, any reasons for not accepting part or all of the recommendation, and details of
any proposed safety action to give effect to the recommendation.
The ATSB can also issue safety advisory notices suggesting that an organisation or an industry
sector consider a safety issue and take action where it believes it appropriate. There is no
requirement for a formal response to an advisory notice, although the ATSB will publish any
response it receives.


there is talk of safety advisory notices,  however these are often issued by the Regulator ( see safety alert on dual gauge point following XPT derailment)

We operate in a highly regulated industry, however how we control risk is markedly different, in Sydney the chosen path was fitting of train stops to mitigate against the effects of a SPAD, other states implemented early versions of a positive train control.

For example, a few weeks ago I was sitting in a plane at Sydney waiting to fly to Adelaide, we were sitting on the cross runway waiting for a path to take off, there was a minor delay whilst several planes, including a jumbo, landed, then we received permission, entered the runway and departed.

Funnily enough there are no hard barriers to safeguard this movement, in railways we have a variety of barriers, including, but not limited to, 2 signal protection, conditional clearing, train stops, positive train control, etc etc etc.

Yet still we breach the integrity of the block ahead, it does not happen often at an airport, what are the differences? 2 up front? monitoring of communication logs, a more draconian discipline policy?

For many years we have had a 'just culture' no blame policy where it is a bit 'its not my fault i stuffed up, its your fault for not training me'

does this need to change, do we need to sack those who transgress rules?

interesting thought?
  Some rail man Junior Train Controller

Location: CIA Headquarters in Washington D.C
Now the incident has been cleared and the investigation is underway what of the two trains themselves? Where are they current stored and when will repairs get underway?
bevans


We could have a Dandenong South/Homesglen scenario again where all the railcars are stored for ages (2+ years) before being repaired and re-entering service again (Victorian Logic).
  woodford Chief Commissioner

theanimal said..........



For example, a few weeks ago I was sitting in a plane at Sydney waiting to fly to Adelaide, we were sitting on the cross runway waiting for a path to take off, there was a minor delay whilst several planes, including a jumbo, landed, then we received permission, entered the runway and departed.

Funnily enough there are no hard barriers to safeguard this movement, in railways we have a variety of barriers, including, but not limited to, 2 signal protection, conditional clearing, train stops, positive train control, etc etc etc.



There actual is a barrier, the aircraft needs a "clearance" from the tower to cross a runway, while this is not a "hard" barrier any pilot who disobeyed would be __VERY__ quickly looking for another job.




Yet still we breach the integrity of the block ahead, it does not happen often at an airport, what are the differences? 2 up front? monitoring of communication logs, a more draconian discipline policy?



Note: this is an opinion piece, you have been warned......(woodford actually does have a pilots licence)

I believe the major difference between the railways and the airline industry at this stage (and for quite a long time in the past) is the amount of attention an air accident gets. On nearly all accidents some person well known in public or the high end of society is killed, this effectively guarantees a good deal of publicty. Such pressure within the industry has resulted in a quite strict safety and qualification system. While it is not always compulsory, the effect of an accident these days will come close to causing an airline to go under, this concentrates modern managements minds wonderfully.

While there have been airlines that have reduced safety standards, quite a few of these have ended up failing sooner or latter often after a single accident.
Even well known airlines can suffer this fate, a recent example is Malaysian Airlines, two acidents within a year has resulted in the airline being taken over by the government to prevent it from going under.

I could write much more on this but one hopes the readers will "get my drift".

woodford
  Lad_Porter Chief Commissioner

Location: Yarra Glen
There actual is a barrier, the aircraft needs a "clearance" from the tower to cross a runway, while this is not a "hard" barrier any pilot who disobeyed would be __VERY__ quickly looking for another job.

woodford

The railway analogy is that a train driver should not pass a signal at Stop without getting a clearance from the train controller.  This has already been discussed.
  theanimal Chief Commissioner

The railway analogy is that a train driver should not pass a signal at Stop without getting a clearance from the train controller. This has already been discussed.
Lad_Porter

Agreed and not an engineered control, only administrative.
  Valvegear Oliver Bullied, CME

Location: Richmond Vic
Do we have any firm confirmation that the spark went past a red signal?  Are we sure that this was not another in the long and sorry line of "signal failures"?
  ab123 Chief Train Controller

The railway analogy is that a train driver should not pass a signal at Stop without getting a clearance from the train controller. This has already been discussed.
Lad_Porter


Unless it is an automatic signal, in which case it is the opposite - if the driver does not want to pass the automatic signal the train controller must be notified
  theanimal Chief Commissioner

Do we have any firm confirmation that the spark went past a red signal? Are we sure that this was not another in the long and sorry line of "signal failures"?
Valvegear

I would question whether it is "long and sorry saga of signal failures"

there are very few wrong side failures, unless you know of more than me?
  Valvegear Oliver Bullied, CME

Location: Richmond Vic
I would question whether it is "long and sorry saga of signal failures"
there are very few wrong side failures, unless you know of more than me?
theanimal

Either there is a large number of signal failures or the traffic/train reports and the news on morning radio are telling porkies.
  theanimal Chief Commissioner

Either there is a large number of signal failures or the traffic/train reports and the news on morning radio are telling porkies.
Valvegear

my apologies, I thought you were referring to wrong side failures
  YM-Mundrabilla Minister for Railways

Location: Mundrabilla but I'd rather be in Narvik
Either there is a large number of signal failures or the traffic/train reports and the news on morning radio are telling porkies.
Valvegear

There have been chronic signal failures for months (if not years) in the Newport - Werribee area.  I assume that these have not been wrongside failures (ie wrong or misleading indications/settings likely to lead to conflicting moves or level crossing protection failures) ie other than the usual failsafe all stop situation.

North Melbourne Junction area is another chronic signal/points failure area.
  toastywarmhamster Station Master

Location: Space and Time
Interesting to see the release of a Safety Bulletin today reiterating the definition of Extreme Caution in bold.

Seems to confirm the empty pass was travelling higher than the maximum allowed.

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