Council needs to fast-track rail before gridlock
First train ride re-enacted for Queensland Rail's 150th birthday
Nambour a better option: Woombye anti-rail stabling group
South west Queensland pushes for more rail services for cattle
Tilt Trains set for a major overhaul
Ipswich celebrates heritage at Rail Museum on Open Day
Two rail lines earmarked for northern Australia
The $55.8 million dual gauge rail line from Acacia Ridge to Bromelton remains unfinished
Police investigate if fallen powerlines on Gold Coast train line work of vandals
Sourcing critical railway upgrade funding needs cool heads and smart solutions
Two passenger trains narrowly avoided a very serious collision on an inner Brisbane line after a driver misread a yellow light for a green and cancelled an automated warning alarm.
Train operators were forced to issue an emergency stop command after a train en route to Brisbane Airport passed through a red signal and stopped just 126 metres short of potential collision point.
A report of the investigation into the near miss at Bowen Hills Train Station on January 10, 2018 was made public today by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
It found that a Citytrain departed Bowen Hills station when a departure signal was displaying a yellow light, meaning the subsequent signal would be set at red.
The driver mistook the first signal for green and continued to drive the train forward.
Approaching the second signal, an automatic warning system generated an alarm in the train driver cab, indicating the signal was in danger, which, if the driver did not acknowledge, would have triggered an emergency brake application.
The driver departed Bowen Hills station, mistaking the yellow signal for a green. Picture: supplied
But the driver pressed the reset button, in what investigators described as a “reflexive response” and did not result in the driver effectively checking the second signal.
The train passed the second red signal, which generated an alarm at Queensland Rail management centre, resulting in a network control officer broadcasting an emergency stop command to the driver.
The driver stopped the train 126 metres short of a crossover and potential conflict point, where another passenger train bound for Roma St had just cleared.
“Had the NCO not issued the stop instruction, there was potential for a collision with another suburban train,” the report found.
The ABSB investigation found the immediate reason for the ‘Signal Passed at Danger’ (SPAD) was that the driver perceived the signal was displaying a green aspect and drove according to that belief.
“Such a ‘completely missed’ SPAD can have very serious consequences as there were limited risk controls or defences in place on the Queensland Rail (QR) Citytrain rail network to recover from the situation,” the report said.
The investigation also identified issues with the automatic warning system.
“Citytrain drivers frequently encounter restricted signals, and so it is understandable how drivers can become conditioned to cancelling the automatic warning system alarm as a habitual, reflexive reaction,” ATSB Director Transport Safety Dr Mike Walker said.
The driver then proceeded through a second signal, with a red light, which generated an alarm at Queensland Rail management centre, resulting in a network control officer (NCO) to broadcast an emergency stop command to the driver. Picture: supplied
There were 33 SPAD events in the last 9 months of 2020 – or nearly one a week – but the rate is even higher now.
The ATSB said Queensland Rail had undertaken a range of actions to change the design.
They have also undertaken a range of activities to improve the implementation of its train driver maintenance of competency process and risk triggered commentary driving.
“The rate that individual drivers pass a signal at danger is extremely low,” the report said.
“Even though SPADs are rare events for most drivers, the role of driver performance in minimising the risk of SPADs is obviously still critically important.
“This investigation provides an opportunity for train drivers to reflect on the need for crosschecking signal information, particularly at locations where there is potential for a signal read-through.”
This article first appeared on www.couriermail.com.au
About this website
Railpage version 3.10.0.0037
All logos and trademarks in this site are property of their respective owner. The comments are property of their posters, all the rest is © 2003-2021 Interactive Omnimedia Pty Ltd.
You can syndicate our news using one of the RSS feeds.